1. The hatred of Serbians and Kosovars for each other is as fierce as ever. Indeed, old wounds have been reopened and new wounds inflicted. A spirit of vengeance is abroad in the land of Yugoslavia, as malevolent and unbridled as it has ever been.

2. The Serbians have not renounced their claim to Kosovo. The agreement with NATO which ended the first part of the war allows for "lightly armed" Yugoslavian military units to come back into Kosovo in June 2000.

3. The Serbian military was not defeated in the first stage of the war. Yugoslavian forces left Kosovo in disciplined, defiant formations. NATO bombing did them little damage. They learned a little about how to out-fox an opponent who attacks with incredibly sophisticated machinery, but with very little real will to fight. The Serbians emerged from the early part of the war more experienced and tougher than they were at the start. As the war has continued in this phase of calm, they have consolidated their strength. It is reported that the government of Yugoslavia is funding the military generously, and that weapons are being made available by Russia.

4. Russian troops are on the ground in Kosovo. This is the single biggest gain made so far by the Serbians. The primary strategic goal of Milosevic throughout this war has been to get the Russians involved. This he has accomplished, at least on a limited basis. The cost to Milosevic was substantial: Serbia had to withdraw from Kosovo. For Milosevic, this was a painful necessity, a tactical withdrawal , a temporary evacuation of ground he intends to get back.

5. NATO troops are on the ground in Kosovo. This is also a net gain for the Serbians, though it has meant they must pull back to new lines for a time. A great object of a commander in war is to join battle where he wants to fight and to maneuver so he gets the kind of battle he wants to fight. In other words, he wants a battle which plays to his strengths, a battle in which his weaknesses will not be exposed. President Clinton had the power of initiative at the outset of this war, and he shrewdly chose to fight in a way that could not be decisive, yet almost guaranteed he would win the first round. Yugoslav air power and air defenses were no match for NATO air power -- not even close. On the other hand, a battle of men and rifles -- a battle on the ground -- is a kind of battle much more to the liking of Serbian commanders. The closer the fighting, the more the lines are mixed up and confused, the less influence American air power can have on the outcome. President Clinton has positioned himself now so the next battles with Serbian forces will be on ground the Serbians know, and they will be the kind of battles Serbian commanders know how to fight and are equipped to fight. The outcome of the next shooting phase of the war will not be easy to predict.

6. When shooting commences again, Serbia commanders may be able to avoid the kind of punishment NATO air power can inflict, but only on the ground in Kosovo where they can get close to NATO positions, thereby forcing pilots flying missions in support of the ground action to come within range of anti-aircraft weapons. Belgrade is another matter. Challenged on the ground in Kosovo, NATO will be able to attack the Yugoslavian homeland with greater ferocity than ever in an effort to break the fighting will of the Serbians. The vulnerability of Yugoslavian territory is a problem that Milosevic (or his successor) will be able to overcome only at the strategic level. If Russia and China are willing to provide strategic pressure, NATO might be forced to limit attacks on Yugoslavian territory.

7. The United States has exposed its weakness. The American obsession with avoiding casualties speaks volumes to our enemies about our true will to fight. If it's casualties that will break our will to fight, we can be assured the enemy will give us casualties, even if he has to suffer casualties himself.

8. Yugoslavia will exploit political tension between NATO countries with greater skill as the war progresses.

9. Not only have the Russians solidified their friendship with the Yugoslavs, but the Chinese have now endorsed the Serbian position on ownership of Kosovo. Russia and China have become remarkably friendly with each other of late. This probably has nothing specifically to do with Kosovo and Yugoslavia, but solidarity between China and Russia, with both favoring Yugoslavian sovereignty in Kosovo, will be important as the war between NATO and Yugoslavia develops over the next months and years.

10. Strategically, Milosevic is not badly positioned. Though he may be isolated from the West, that isolation is greatly mitigated by companionship with Moscow and Beijing. Tactically, Milosevic is in a somewhat better position than he was, with respect to NATO. NATO now has a bridgehead in Kosovo (with stretched lines of communication and supply). Holding this bridgehead against a determined and well armed Serbian army will be a challenge for NATO commanders. We can't predict what strategic pressures may be exerted by Russia and China.